Criminal Cases (UK Academic List)

Published 2022-05-28

1 – Actus Reus

Woolmington v DPP [1935]

Category
Mens rea

Story
Reginald Woolmington was a 21-year-old farm labourer who married 17-year-old Violet. After Violet gave birth to his child, they broke up and Violet left the matrimonial home to live with her mother. One day, Woolmington stole a double-barreled shotgun and then cycled to his mother-in-law’s house where he shot and killed Violet.

Woolmington’s defence was that he did not intend to kill and thus lacked the necessary mens rea. Specifically, he claimed that he had wanted to win her back and planned to scare her.

Judgement
Not guilty. Lack of mens rea. The conviction was quashed, AND Woolmington was acquitted.

Ratio decidendi
In a trial for murder, the prosecution must prove death as the result of a voluntary act of accused and the malice of accused. When evidence of death and malice has been given, the accused is entitled to show by evidence or by examination of the circumstances adduced by the prosecution that the act on his part which caused death was either unintentional or provoked.

If the jury is either satisfied with his explanation or, upon a review of all the evidence, are left in reasonable doubt whether, even if his explanation is not accepted, the act was unintentional or provoked, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.

R v Pittwood [1902]

Category
Actus reus

Story
The defendant was employed by a railway company to operate gate of track. He lifted the gate but then forgot to put it back before going for his lunch break. During his absence, a cart by horse crossed the track and was hit by a passing train. Cart driver was killed.

The defendant was thus convicted of manslaughter and subsequently applied for permission to appeal.

Judgement
Guilty. Criminal liability can be based on a breach of a contractual duty.

Ratio decidendi
The court held that as the defendant had been under a contractual duty to close the gate, his omission to perform this obligation was capable of constituting the actus reus for murder.

R v Gibbins and Proctor [1918]

Category
Actus reus

Story
A child’s father and his common-law wife neglected and starved his child. The child died of starvation.

Judgement
Guilty.

Ratio decidendi
The court decided that murder can be committed by a failure to act in circumstances where a duty of care to the victim is imposed on the defendant.

The Court suggested it was self-evident that the father was under a duty to look after his own child. Although the child did not belong to his wife biologically, she was also found to be under such a duty. This is because she had taken money for food from her husband which could have been used to feed the victim.

The Court also said that a calculated and deliberate strategy of starving someone to death must clearly be capable of constituting a killing.

R v Instan [1893]

Category
Actus reus

Story
Instan, the defendant, took financial support from her 73 year-old aunt and was supposed to provide her aunt food and medical help to aunt’s new disease Gangrene.

But the defendant didn’t provide support. Aunt died.

Judgement
Guilty.

Ratio decidendi
Whilst the aunt had the gangrene infection, the victim could only be aided by Instan and it was only Instan that had knowledge of her condition in the final days of her life. On this basis, it was held that Instan owed the victim a duty of care and that she did not discharge this duty with the actions mentioned in the facts. The failure to do so was deemed to at least accelerate the death of the deceased.

R v Stone and Dobinson [1977]

Category
Actus reas

Story
Mr Stone was disabled, his housekeeper Ms. Dobinson had learning difficulties. These 2 defendants agreed to look after Mr Stone’s sister who had anorexia nervosa.

But the 2 defendants failed to do so, the victim was found dead shortly afterwards in disgusting conditions.

Judgement
Guilty.

Ratio decidendi
The court held that the defendants had assumed responsibility for the victim upon agreeing to look after her. For Mr Stone, she was his blood relative (his sister). Dobinson had assumed a responsibility for the victim by agreeing to care for her and by providing her with food at the beginning of her time living with them. This meant that their omission to provide this care and to alert the relevant medical authorities to her condition, made them liable for her death.

R v Miller [1983]

Category
Actus rea

Story
Miller, a vagrant, after got drunk, went back to a house he was squatting in, lit a cigarette and fell asleep. Upon waking and seeing that the mattress he was lying on was on fire, he got up, went into the next room and went back to sleep.
When he awoke again, the house was on fire.

Judgement
Guilty.

Ratio decidendi
The court concluded that as he was responsible for having created the dangerous situation, the defendant was under a duty to take action to resolve it once he became aware of the fire. It was not necessary that the defendant was subjectively aware of the risk of damage posed by the fire, provided that this would be obvious to a reasonable person who troubled to turn his mind to the matter.

R v White [1910]

Category
Actus reus
But-for test for factual causation

Story
White placed poison in his mother’s drink intending this would kill her. She drank some of the drink, but before the poison could take effect the victim died of an unrelated heart attack.

Judgement
No actus reus of murder committed (attempted murder only)

Ratio decidendi
The defendant was only convicted of attempted murder because the poison ended up playing no role whatsoever in her death. The victim did not die as a result of the victim’s actions but due to an unrelated heart attack (“but-for” test of causation).

R v Kennedy #2 [2007]

Category
Actus reus
Chain of causation

Story
The defendant supplied the victim with a heroin-filled syringe which the defendant voluntarily and independently self-injected. As a result, the victim died from choking on his own vomit.

Issue
Whether the “own voluntary behaviour” broke the chain of causation and prevented the defendant from a legal cause of the victim’s death.

Judgement
Not guilty.

Ratio decidendi
The defendant’s manslaughter conviction was quashed. The victim’s decision as a consenting adult to self-inject the heroin was held to be a voluntary and informed decision. As a result, this was a novus actus interveniens which broke the chain of causation between supplying the heroin and the death.

R v Dalloway [1847]

Category
Legal causation

Story
Dalloway, was driving a horse and cart along a road without holding on to the reins. A child ran in front of the defendant’s cart, was run over and killed.

Judgement
Not guilty.

Ratio decidendi
1/5 legal causation: The consequence must be attributable to a culpable act.

The defendant was not liable as he would not have been able to stop the cart in time even if he had been holding the reins. This case is authority for the point that the result must be caused by a culpable act. Here the culpable act was not holding the reins, which was not the cause of death.

R v Pagett [1983]

Category
Legal causation

Story
Mr. Paggett, 31yr old, separated from his wife, formed a relationship with a 16-yr old girl, made the girl pregnant, and became violent towards the girl. When the girl wanted to break up, he drove to the girl’s parents house with a shotgun. He shot the father, took the mother, and kidnapped the girl as hostage and a human shield. When he fired at police, the police returned fire, killed the girl.

Judgement
Guilty.

Ratio decidendi
2/5 legal causation: the culpable act must be more than a minimal cause of the consequence

5/5 legal causation: the chain of causation must not be broken

The firing at the police officers caused them to fire back. In firing back the police officers were acting in self-defence. His using the girl as a shield caused her death.

R v Benge [1865]

Category
Legal causation

Story
Mr Benge was repairing and replacing railway tracks. He misread the train timetable and got the wrong time for the arrival of a train.

A different workman was also negligent, he was sent to warn the approaching train to stop. However, instead of going the 1000 yards which he was supposed to, he only went 540 yards.

The train driver was also not paying attention to the signals. Therefore, the train was unable to stop before it reached the work area, crashed and many people were killed.

Judgement
Guilty.

Ratio decidendi
3/5 legal causation: the culpable act need not be the sole cause.

Mr Benge was found to have been the substantial and significant cause of the accident.

R v Hayward [1908]

Category
Legal causation

Story
The defendant chased his wife out of the house shouting threats at her. She collapsed and died. He did not physically touch her. She was suffering from a rare thyroid condition which could lead to death where physical exertion was accompanied by fright and panic. Both the defendant and his wife were unaware she had this condition.

Judgement
Guilty.

Ratio decidendi
4/5 legal causation: the accused must take his victim as he finds him (for pre-existing medical conditions).

The egg shell (thin) skull rule applied. He was therefore fully liable despite the fact an ordinary person of reasonable fortitude would not have died in such circumstances.

R v Blaue [1975]

Category
Legal causation

Story
The victim had refused the defendant’s request to have sex with him, as a result of which the defendant stabbed her. The victim was admitted to hospital but due to her beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness she refused the blood transfusion which would save her life. She subsequently died.

Judgement
Guilty.

Ratio decidendi
4/5 legal causation: the accused must take his victim as he finds him (for mental conditions or religious beliefs).

This case established that the defendant must take the victim as he finds them, including their religious beliefs.

R v Cheshire [1991]

Category
Legal causation

Story
The defendant shot a man in the stomach and thigh. The man was taken to hospital where he was operated on and developed breathing difficulties. The hospital gave him a tracheotomy. Several weeks later his wounds were healing and no longer life-threatening, however, he continued to have breathing difficulty and died from complications arising from the tracheotomy. The defendant was convicted of murder.

Judgement
Guilty.

Ratio decidendi
Intervening act type 1: medical intervention.

It was clear that the negligent medical treatment in this case was the immediate cause of the victim’s death but that did not absolve the accused unless the treatment was so independent the accused’s act to regard the contribution as insignificant.

R v Wallace [2018]

Category
Legal causation

Story
The victim in this case was a Mark van Dongen, who was a Dutch national, living and working in the Bristol area as an engineer. He and the defendant, Berlinah Wallace, had been in a relationship which had broken up. The victim had visited the defendant at her flat, at her request and had ended up staying the night. Whilst he was asleep, the defendant threw sulphuric acid on him with the words; “If I can’t have you, no one else will”. His injuries were so horrific the jury was not allowed to see photographs of him on his arrival at hospital or during his treatment. He had full thickness burns to 25% of his body, was in a coma for 4 months, lost the sight in one eye and most of the sight in the other, his lower left leg had to be amputated and he was paralysed – at one point, only being able to move his tongue. Mark was eventually discharged to a care home, where he was found in a dreadful state by his father, who organised a private ambulance to take him to a hospital in Belgium. After developing further complications, Mark applied for euthanasia, which is legal in Belgium and his request was granted. He died on 2 January 2017.

Judgement
Guilty.

Ratio decidendi
Intervening act type 2: Intervention by third-party.

The judge emphasized the cruelty of the crime, the horrific extent of van Dongen’s injuries and the complete lack of remorse Wallace demonstrated. The judge gave Wallace a life sentence, with a minimum of 12 years to be served before she can be considered eligible for parole.

2 – Mens Rea & Strict Liability

Hill v Baxter [1958]

Category
Mens rea

Story
The defendant was charged with dangerous driving. He claimed to have no memory from an early point in his journey to immediately after the incident. He contended that he had been overcome by a sudden illness and was therefore not liable under criminal law.

Issue
Defendant argued that whilst he was driving, he was driving in a state of automatism and he lacked mens rea.

Judgement
Guilty.

Ratio decidendi
As dangerous driving under the Road Traffic Act 1930 was an offence of strict liability, lack of mens rea would not be enough to exculpate him.

R v Nedrick [1986]

Category
Mens rea

Story
The defendant, Hansford Nedrick, had a grudge against a woman Viola and threatened to “burn her out”. One night he poured oil through the letterbox of Viola’s home and lit up a fire.

The fire got out of control and a boy in the house was killed.

Issue
Whether a jury is entitled to infer intent if they consider a defendant’s actions highly likely to cause death or serious bodily harm.

Judgement
Nedrick’s appeal against conviction of murder was allowed.

Ratio decidendi
Lord Lane CJ:

“the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to infer the necessary intention, unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant’s actions and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case.”

R v Woollin [1999]

Category
Mens rea

Story
The appellant threw his 3-month-old baby son onto a hard surface. The baby suffered a fractured skull and died. The trial judge directed the jury that if they were satisfied the defendant “must have realized and appreciated when he threw that child that there was a substantial risk that he would cause serious injury to it, then it would be open to you to find that he intended to cause injury to the child and you should convict him of murder.”

The jury convicted of murder and also rejected the defence of provocation. The defendant appealed on the grounds that in referring to ‘substantial risk’ the judge had widened the definition of murder and should have referred to virtual certainty in accordance with Nedrick guidance.

The Court of Appeal rejected the appeal holding that there was no absolute obligation to refer to virtual certainty.

Judgement
Manslaughter instead of murder.

Ratio decidendi
Murder conviction was substituted with manslaughter conviction. There was a material misdirection which expanded the mens rea of murder and therefore the murder conviction was unsafe. The House of Lords substantially agreed with the Nedrick guidelines with a minor modification, which led to the main principle of “indirect intent” (sometimes it’s called “oblique intent”).

Philpott [2012/2013]

Category
Mens rea

Story
Michael (Mick) Philpott, born in 1956, who is controlling and violent, enjoyed his benefits-founded and polyamorous lifestyle. At age of 21 he attempted to murder his 15-year-old girlfriend and committed serious GBH to her.

Since 2001, Philpott had been living with Mairead Fuffy (wife) and Lisa Willis (mistress) and their 16 children in a Derby house.

On 2012-05-11, the house was damaged by fire around 4am, 6 children who were sleeping upstairs, died due to excessive smoke inhalation.

Police found petro by Philpott and Mairead, charged them + a friend Paul Mosley with arson.

Later the charges against Philpott and Mairead were reduced to manslaughter, as it was decided that the couple had not intended to kill their children. Instead, they had wanted to frame Willis for the fire, win back custody of the children and continue to claim benefits for them.

Judgement
Mick, Mairead, Mosley, were each found guilty of the manslaughter of 6 children. On 2013-04-04, Philpott was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum tariff of 15 years. In 2000 Mairead was released after serving half of her sentence.

R v Cunningham [1957]

Category
Mens rea
Recklessness

Story
The defendant removed a gas meter to steal the money inside, gas then thus gradually leaked and partially asphyxiated his future mother-in-law who was sleeping.

Trial judge understanding of law: The trial judge explained the word “maliciously” to mean general wickedness, and because of that as to stealing the money from the gas meter the mens rea for the crime was present.

The appellate judges quashed the conviction because “maliciously” was to be read to mean that the result was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s actions.

Judgement
Conviction was quashed.

Ratio decidendi
The correct test for malice was whether the defendant had either actual intent to cause harm or was reckless as to the possibility of causing foreseeable harm. This is known as “Cunningham Recklessness”. The jury should have been left to decide whether, even without intending to cause harm, the appellant removed the gas meter despite foreseeing that its removal could cause harm to his future mother-in-law.

R v Caldwell [1982]

Category
Mens rea
Recklessness

Story
The appellant had been working at a hotel and had a grudge against his employer. One night after being heavily drunk he went to the hotel and started a fire. The hotel had guests sleeping in the hotel at the time and fortunately the fire was discovered and distinguished early and no people were actually harmed.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated criminal damage under s.1(2) Criminal Damage Act 1971 and appealed in relation to the required level of recklessness. The defendant argued that he had given no thought as to the possible endangerment of life due to his intoxicated state.

Judgement
Conviction upheld.

Ratio decidendi
House of Lords upheld his conviction and formulated what has become known as Caldwell recklessness:

A person is reckless as to whether property is destroyed or damaged where:

(1) he does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk that property will be destroyed or damaged and

(2) when he does the act he either has not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or has recognised that there was some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to do it.

Caldwell recklessness was eventually overruled by R v G [2013]

R v G [2003]

Category
Mens rea
Recklessness

Story
The two boys, aged 11 and 12, went camping for a night without their parents’ permission. The boys found some old newspapers outside the Co-op which they lit with a lighter and then threw them under a wheelie bin. They then left without putting them out assuming they would naturally burn out. In fact the burning newspapers set light to the wheelie bin and the fire spread to the Co-op shop and caused over £1m of damage.

Judgement
Convictions were quashed

Ratio decidendi
For which various offences it held that the prosecution must show a defendant subjectively appreciated a particular risk existing or going to exist to the health or property of another, and the damaging consequence, but carried on in the circumstances known to him unreasonably (to this latter stage of thought an objective test continues to apply) taking the risk. It abolished the “objective recklessness” test set out in R v Caldwell.

Ds were not guilty of arson as they had not been reckless; they had been unable to appreciate the risk due to their immaturity (test for recklessness is subjective).

Sweet v Parsley [1970]

Category
Mens rea
Strict Liability

Story
A school teacher let her house out to students. The students were smoking cannabis in the house. She was unaware of this activity. She was charged with an offence of being concerned with the management of premises which were being used for the purposes of smoking cannabis contrary to s.5(6) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965. The statute did not state any requirement of mens rea of the offence.

Judgement
Convicted due to strict liability (but quashed later)

Ratio decidendi
Strict liability: Even though she had no knowledge of the offence, it was on her property so she was liable without fault.

(This conviction was later quashed by the House of Lords on the grounds that knowledge of the use of the premises was essential to the offence. Since she had no such knowledge, she did not commit the offence.)

R v Latimer [1886]

Category
Mens rea
Transferred malice

Story
The defendant was in an argument with another in a pub. The argument escalated and the defendant attempted to hit the other man with his belt, but missed. While only marginally hitting his intended victim, the defendant’s blow was instead redirected and hit a woman standing next to the intended victim. The woman was severely injured. The defendant was prosecuted for unlawful and malicious wounding, contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, section 20.

Judgement
Liable for the injury of actual victim

Ratio decidendi
Defendant was held to be liable for the injuries of his actual victim despite having no intention to injure her.

The court held that it is possible to use the doctrine of transferred malice outside of the bounds of murder cases. It was therefore possible to rely upon in in cases such as for a s.20 OAPA situation of inflicting of bodily injury.

R v Pembliton [1874]

Category
Mens rea
Transferred malice

Story
The defendant threw some stones into a crowd of people. He wanted to disperse the crowd. A stone hit and smashed a window. He was convicted of criminal damage and appealed.

Issue
Did the defendant have the mens rea for criminal damage?

Judgement
Not liable for the damage to property

Ratio decidendi
His mens rea for an offence against the person could not be transferred to a property offence as they are entirely different offences.

Fagan v MPC (Metropolitan Police Commissioner) [1969]

Category
Actus reus
Mens rea

Story
A police constable asked the defendant to park his car in order to question him. The defendant complied, but in the process accidentally drove onto the constable’s foot. The police constable asked the defendant to move his car off their foot. The defendant initially refused, saying the constable could ‘wait’. He moved the car a short time later.

The defendant argued at the time of the actus reus, the driving onto the foot, he lacked the mens rea of any offence since it was purely accidental. When he formed the mens rea, he lacked the actus reus as he did nothing.

Issue
Whether the prosecution had proven facts which had amounted to an assault because for an assault to be committed both actus reus and mens rea must be established at the same time.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
It was held that Fagan’s crime was not the refusal to move the car but that having driven on to the foot of the officer and decided not to cease the act, he had established a continual act of battery. This meant that actus reus and mens rea were present and as such, an assault was committed. Fagan’s conviction was upheld.

Thabo Meli v R [1954]

Category
Actus reus
Mens rea

Story
The 4 defendants were convicted of murder. They had planned to kill a man and then make it look like an accident. They took him to a hut and beat him over the head. Believing that he was dead, they then took his body to a cliff and threw it off. Medical evidence showed that the deceased died from exposure of being left at the bottom of the cliff and not from the blow to the head. They appealed against their convictions on the grounds that the actus reus and mens rea of the crime did not coincide. That is to say when they formed the intention to kill, there was no actus reus as the man was still alive. When they threw him off the cliff, there was no mens rea as they can intend to kill someone they believed was already dead.

Issue
Should the defendant be found guilty of muder, even though he did not have the mens rea when throwing the body off cliff?

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
The act of beating him and throwing him off the cliff was one continuing act. Thabo Meli is relevant to the coincidence of AR and MR;

The defendant’s actions were analyzed as part of a general plan to cause death and to hide the body: a series of acts that could be linked within one logical transaction. Therefore, analyzed in this way, since the defendant possessed the mens rea for murder at one point during the single transaction. As a result, coincidence was found.

DPP v Majewski [1977]

Category
Mens rea
Intoxication

Story
The appellant Majewski was convicted following a brawl in a pub in which he assaulted the landlord and customers and the police officers who arrested him. His defence was that he was under the influence of drink and drugs at the time so he contended that he could not be convicted when he lacked the mens rea of the offences due to his intoxicated state.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
The crime was one of basic intent and therefore his intoxication could not be relied on as a defence. The Lord Judge drew a distinction between offences of “basic intent” and “specific intent” and held that in cases of the former, voluntary intoxication cannot form the basis for a defence even if the intoxication produces a state of automatism.

Cundy v Le Coq [1884]

Category
Mens rea

Story
The defendant was convicted of unlawfully selling alcohol to an intoxicated person, contrary to s.13 of the Licensing Act 1872. On appeal, the defendant contended that he had been unaware of the customer’s drunkenness and thus should be acquitted.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
It was held that it was not necessary to consider whether the defendant knew, or had means of knowing, or could with ordinary care have detected that the person served was drunk. If he served a drink to a person who was in fact drunk, he was guilty.

PSBG (Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain) v Storkwain Ltd [1986]

Category
Mens rea
Strict liability

Story
The appellant, a pharmacist was convicted of an offence under s.58(2) of the Medicines Act 1968 of supplying prescription drugs without a prescription given by an appropriate medical practitioner. The appellant had allowed prescription drugs to be supplied on production of fraudulent prescriptions whereby a doctor’s signature had been copied. The appellant was not party to the fraud and had no knowledge of the forged signatures and believed the prescriptions were genuine.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
The offence was one of strict liability. The House of Lords looked at other sections of the Medicines Act 1968 and found that some sections referred to a requirement of mens rea whereas other sections did not. They concluded that the omission to refer to mens rea in s.58 must therefore have been deliberate and so the presumption of mens rea was rebutted.

Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972]

Category
Mens rea
Strict liability

Story
The appellant factory owner was convicted of causing polluted matter to enter a river under the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951. The offence related to an underground pipe which had become disconnected due to a blockage. The appellant was unaware of the pollution and it was not alleged that they had been negligent.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
As a matter of public policy the offence was one of strict liability.

Salabiaku v France [1991 ECHR]

Category
Mens rea
Strict liability

Story
The applicant, Mr. Amosi Salabiaku, is a national of Zaire residing in Paris. He was arrested in the airport on the suspicion of drug-trafficking. Mr. Salabiaku stated that the bag containing 10 kilo of cannabis did not belong to him. The bag was not registered on the name of applicant, but he was carrying it when was arrested. The applicant relies on the right to a fair trial and complains that the domestic court ignored the principle of the presumption of innocence.
Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
Strict liability offences do not infringe Art 6 ECHR.

Acquitted: the criminal offence of unlawful importation of narcotics (giving him the benefit of the doubt)

Upheld: customs offence of smuggling prohibited goods.

3 – Homicide

R v Moloney [1985]

Category
Mens rea

Story
The defendant and his stepfather who had a friendly and loving relationship were engaged in a drunken competition to see which of them could load a shotgun faster than the other. Moloney won, and was then challenged by his stepfather to fire the gun. He did, killing his stepfather instantly. Moloney was charged with murder and convicted. He appealed and the Court of Appeal allowed appeal to the House of Lords.

Issue
Did the mens rea of murder require direct intent to kill or cause serious bodily harm, or was foresight of a serious likelihood of harm occurring sufficient?

Judgement
Appeal allowed

Ratio decidendi
He had not intended to kill his stepfather. Knowledge of foresight of the consequences of an action were to be considered at best material from which a crime of intent may be inferred. Where the defendant’s purpose was other than to cause serious bodily harm or death to another then the jury may infer intent if the consequence of the defendant’s act was a natural consequence, and the defendant foresaw that this was a natural consequence of his act.

DPP v Smith [1961]

Category
Mens rea

Story
Jim Smith was ordered by a police constable to stop his car which contained stolen goods, however Smith accelerated instead. The police constable jumped onto the car, but fell off and was killed by another oncoming car after S violently swerved the car. S was convicted of murder and appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal.

Trial judge directed the jury in stating that the mens rea test for murder was whether a reasonable man would have contemplated (objective).

Smith claimed that the mens rea for murder is subjective, and the trial judge had misdirected. The Court of Criminal Appeal, finding the test to be subjective and the trial judge to have misdirected the jury.

Issue
Whether the mens rea of intent for murder is a subjective or an objective test.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
The House of Lords held that an objective test was applicable to the mens rea of intent for murder, therefore there was no misdirection and the murder conviction was to be reinstated. Where the accused is capable of forming an intent in that he is not insane nor suffering from diminished responsibility, any actual intention is immaterial, and the mens rea test for a conviction of murder is what in all the circumstances the ordinary reasonable man would have contemplated to be the natural and probable result of the grievous bodily harm done.

R v Jewell [2014]

Category
Mens rea
Loss of control as defence

Story
The defendant Darren Jewell had driven to the victim’s house (the victim is his workmate, he claimed his workmate intimated him). He had shot the victim twice and was convicted of murder, he appealed claiming he had lost the ability of control.

Issue
Can loss of control be established? Can loss of control be used as a defence?

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
Overall, the defendant was charged with murder due to insufficient evidence to raise the partial defence of loss of control.

R v Clinton [2012]

Category
Mens rea
Loss of control as defence

Story
The defendant and his wife both suffered from depression and financial difficulties. The couple agreed to a trial separation for 4 weeks as she needed time out. She left him with the children and moved into her parent’s home.

The defendant did not cope well with this and became obsessional and had been looking at suicide websites. Two weeks later she revealed to him that she was having an affair. He asked for her to come to the matrimonial home in order to tell the children together that their marriage was over. She agreed to meet. However he had arranged for the children to be elsewhere at the time she was due to come and he was heavily intoxicated. At the meeting he killed her by repeatedly beating her on the head with a wooden baton and strangled her with a belt. He then took photos of her naked body in various poses and texted them to her lover.

Judgement
Conviction for murder was quashed.

Ratio decidendi
The defence of loss of control should have been put to the jury. His conviction for murder was quashed and a retrial ordered.

Sexual infidelity can not be relied upon on its own as a qualifying trigger, but its existence does not prevent reliance on the defence where there exist other qualifying triggers.

DPP v Newbury and Jones [1976]

Category
Mens rea

Story
The defendants, both teenage boys, had thrown a piece of paving stone from a railway bridge onto a train which had been passing beneath them. The object struck and killed the guard who had been sitting in the driver’s compartment.

Judgement
Conviction for involuntary manslaughter upheld.

Ratio decidendi
The defendants were convicted of manslaughter, and appealed on the ground that they had not foreseen that their actions might cause harm to any other person.

The House of Lords held that there is no requirement that the defendant foresees that some harm will result from his action.

R v Goodfellow [1986]

Category
Mens rea

Story
The defendant wished to move out from his council accommodation. In order to get re-housed he set fire to his own council house making it look as if it had been petrol bombed. Unfortunately his wife, son and son’s girlfriend all died in the fire.

Judgement
Conviction for involuntary manslaughter upheld.

Ratio decidendi
There was no requirement that the unlawful act was directed at the victims nor that it was directed at a person.

R v Lowe [1973]

Category
Mens rea

Story
Mr Lowe, of low intelligence, did not call a doctor to his sick infant child. The child died from dehydration and gross emaciation. The trial judge directed the jury that if they found him guilty of the offence of neglect they must also find him guilty of manslaughter on the grounds that neglect was an unlawful act. The jury convicted him of both neglect and manslaughter. Lowe appealed.

Judgement
Conviction for manslaughter quashed

Ratio decidendi
As to the unlawful act, the defendant must engage in a positive act and an omission will not suffice.

R v Church [1966]

Category
Mens rea
Dangerousness

Story
Sylvia Notts and Mr. Church were having sex in a van. She started mocking him for fun. He got angry and knocked her unconscious. He tried to wake her up and then he believed she was dead, then he threw her body into a river. Medical evidence revealed that the cause of death was drowning and she therefore had been alive when he threw her into the river.

Judgement
Conviction for manslaughter upheld

Ratio decidendi
This authority set out the test for dangerousness:

“The conclusion of this Court is that an unlawful act causing the death of another cannot, simply because it is an unlawful act, render a manslaughter verdict inevitable. For such a verdict inexorably to follow, the unlawful act must be such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognize must subject the other person to, at least, the risk of some harm resulting therefrom, albeit not serious harm.”

R v Adomako [1995]

Category
Mens rea
Gross negligence manslaughter

Story
The defendant was an anaesthetist in charge of a patient during an eye operation. During the operation an oxygen pipe became disconnected and the patient died. The appellant failed to notice or respond to obvious signs of disconnection. The jury convicted him of gross negligence manslaughter.

Issue
When is a breach of duty ‘gross’ (enough) for the purposes of gross negligence manslaughter?

Judgement
Conviction for gross negligence manslaughter.

Ratio decidendi
The judge’s summing up sufficiently stressed to the jury the high degree of negligence required for a breach to be ‘gross’.

R v Singh [1999]

Category
Mens rea
Gross negligence manslaughter

Story
Singh, landlord, owed a duty of care to a tenant of a lodging house who died as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning from a defective gas fire.

Judgement
Conviction for gross negligence manslaughter.

Ratio decidendi
The defendant owed victim a duty of care through tenancy agreement. Defendant breached as defendant had sufficient information about dangers of defective gas boiler and took no action.

R v Zaman [2017]

Category
Mens rea
Gross Negligence manslaughter

Story
The victim (Paul Wilson) purchased and ate, a takeaway meal from the defendant’s (Mohammed Zaman) restaurant. Mr Wilson had specifically stated his allergy to nuts, and the waiter who served Mr Wilson assured him the sauce contained no nuts. However, tragically, this was not the case, and Mr Wilson was found dead in his home after suffering an anaphylactic shock; due to a sauce which, contained substantial amounts of peanuts.

Judgement
Conviction for gross negligence manslaughter.

Ratio decidendi
After being found guilty of gross negligence manslaughter and other food safety offences, Mr Zaman was sentenced to six years imprisonment.

4 – Criminal Damage

Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon & Somerset Constabulary [1986]

Category
Criminal Damage

Story
The defendants were climate protestors. As part of a protest, they used water soluble paint to paint silhouettes on public pavement. The paint was designed to wash away in rain water. Before this could happen, however, the local council arranged to have the pavement specially cleaned.

The defendants were charged with criminal damage. They argued that they were not guilty because they had not ‘damaged’ the pavement.

Issue
Does using water soluble paint on property constitute damage?

Judgement
Damage has been made so criminal offence established

Ratio decidendi
In this case, it did not matter that the markings could be washed away, there had been damage nonetheless as there had been expense and inconvenience caused to the local authority.

A (a juvenile) v R [1978]

Category
Criminal Damage

Story
The defendant spat on a policeman’s raincoat. The spittle could be easily wiped off and left no permanent damage.

Judgement
No damage, so no criminal offence

Ratio decidendi
It was held that this did not constitute unlawful damage to property because no expense was incurred. It would have been different if the material was different and left a stain or required dry cleaning.

R v Dudley [1989]

Category
Criminal Damage

Story
The defendant had a grievance with the victim and threw a firebomb at the house of victim. Minimal damage caused, but the fact that fire was able to be put out didn’t help the defendant to establish any defence at all.

Judgement
Aggravated arson convicted

Ratio decidendi
The court held, the important issue was whether life was endangered or not, in this case it was regardless of how little the firebomb caused the damage.

The fact is that, the intention was there by destruction or damage regardless if life was in fact endangered.

R v Steer [1986]

Category
Criminal Damage

Story
The appellant had an argument with a former business partner and went round to his house armed with a gun. He rang the doorbell and then fired shots through the windows and doors. He was convicted of aggravated criminal damage under s.1(2) Criminal Damage Act 1971

Judgement
Conviction to (aggravated) criminal damage quashed.

Ratio decidendi
The Crown’s appeal was dismissed and Steer’s conviction was quashed. The recklessness or intention specified by the Criminal Damage Act 1971 section 1 (2) was intended to cover danger to life caused by property damage, not the dangers that could be caused by the method the damage was inflicted (i.e. the rifle). The prosecution was unable to prove that the danger to life was caused by the danger to the property.

Instead, Steer who has in his possession a firearm commits a distinct offence under the Firearms Act 1968 section 16.

Jaggard v Dickinson [1981]

Category
Criminal Damage
Mistake as defence

Story
The appellant had been out drinking for the evening and became stranded with no money or lift home. She went to a friend’s house and knocked on the door. There was no answer, so believing her friend would consent in the circumstances, she broke into the house. In fact it was not her friend’s house.

Judgement
No criminal damage

Ratio decidendi
The defendant was entitled to rely on mistake as a defence under s5(2)(a) Criminal Damage Act 1971 which provides that it is a lawful excuse for a person committing criminal damage that they honestly believed the person who owned the property in question would have consented.

R v Hill and Hall [1989]

Category
Criminal Damage
Lawful excuse as defence

Story
Hill and Hall were charged with possession of an article with intent to damage the US Army Base’s property. These 2 guys, who did not like the US Army base being so nearby to them, used a big hacksaw to cut the US Army base’s fence (barbed wire).

After they were arrested, they claimed they were part of a CND campaign (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament), so had an honest belief that the damage was justified to protect other property (of more people), because if the US Army base is not there, it won’t be nuclear attacked during a war, thus its surrounding area would be safer.

Judgement
Lawful excuse as defence not established.

Ratio decidendi
No immediate need for protection. The defendants’ acts would be too remote from the eventual harm they were protecting the property from.

Johnson v DPP [1994]

Category
Criminal Damage
Lawful excuse as defence

Story
A squatter’s claimed that his purpose in chiselling the lock off a door of a disused house and replacing them with his own lock, was to protect the squatter’s own belongings from theft.

Judgement
Lawful excuse as defence not established.

Ratio decidendi
It was held that there was no evidence that the disused house was actually in immediate need of protection, so that future risk of theft to the squatter was totally insufficient there t

Blake v DPP [1993]

Category
Criminal Damage
Lawful excuse as defence

Story
A vicar (who believed, on the command of God) wrote with a felt-tip pen on a pillar near the Houses of Parliament. He argued he was seeking to prevent the first Iraq war and therefore relied on section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 as his defence.

Judgement
Lawful excuse as defence not established.

Ratio decidendi
The division court rejected the argument that he believed God owned the property and had consented to the damage.

R v Pembliton [1874]

Category
Criminal Damage
Mens rea

Story
The defendant threw stones into a crowd of people. He wanted to disperse the crowd. A stone hit and smashed a window. He was convicted of criminal damage and appealed.

Judgement
Not liable for the damage to property

Ratio decidendi
His mens rea for an offence against the person could not be transferred to a property offence as they are entirely different offences.

5 – Assaults, Battery, ABH, GBH & Defence & Intoxication

R v Miller [1954]

Category
ABH s.47 OAPA

Story
The defendant’s wife had left him in 1952. The following year she petitioned for divorce. Before the hearing for the petition the husband had sexual intercourse with her against her will. He had thrown her to the ground on three occasions and she was in a hysterical and nervous condition as a result of his actions. He was charged with rape and assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s.47 OAPA 1861. The defendant relied on the marital consent exception to rape and that nervous shock does not amount to a bodily injury.

Judgement
Defendant was liable for ABH

Ratio decidendi
The petition for divorce did not revoke the marital consent to sexual intercourse thus no charge for rape could result. There was nothing to prevent the defendant from being liable for any other offence against the person for actions in committing rape. The defendant was thus liable for ABH.

R v Savage [1991]

Category
ABH s.47 OAPA

Story
Ms. Savage met her husband’s ex-girlfriend in a pub and threw a pint of beer over the victim. The glass slipped out of her hand and smashed and cut the victim’s wrist. The defendant contended that she had not intended to throw the glass, just the beer.

Judgement
Defendant was liable for ABH

Ratio decidendi
It was not necessary to demonstrate the defendant had the mens rea in relation to level of harm inflicted. It was sufficient that they intended or could foresee that some harm will result.

R v Parmenter [1991]

Category
GBH s.20
ABH s.47

Story
The defendant was convicted on four counts of causing GBH to his baby son under s.20. The baby suffered injuries to his boney structures of his legs and forearms due to the heavy handed way the defendant handled the baby. The defendant was not used to handling young babies and did not know that his actions would result in injuries.

Judgement
GBH: No.
ABH: Yes.

Ratio decidendi
The appeal was allowed. His convictions under s.20 were substituted with convictions for ABH under s.47.

Moriarty v Brookes [1834]

Category
GBH s.20

Story
In a pub, the publican (meaning “owner of the pub”, the defendant), argued with a customer over a disputed payment and struck the customer causing a cut below his eye. The publican argued he had asked the customer to leave and he had refused to do so and the force was lawfully applied in ejecting him from the pub.

Judgement
Defendant was liable for GBH

Ratio decidendi
The defendant had used excessive force. The Lord Lyndhurst CB set the definition of a wound as “The definition of a wound in criminal cases is an injury to the person, by which the skin is broken. If the skin is broken, and there was a bleeding, that is a wound.

JJC v Eisenhower [1984]

Category
GBH s.20

Story
The defendant, a minor, shot multiple rounds from an air gun at a group of people, of which one airgun pellet hit the victim, also a minor, in the face, which ruptured internal blood vessel’s near the victim’s eye, causing bruising and swelling.

Judgement
Conviction was set aside

Ratio decidendi
A conviction under section 20 for wounding required evidence of a break in the continuity of the skin. A scratch is insufficient, there needed to be a breach in the whole of the skin, and not merely the outer layer called the epidermis or the cuticles, in order to establish a wound.

DPP v Woods [2002]

Category
Racially aggravated assault

Story
The defendant called a doorman (victim) a “black bastard” prior to an assault. The motivation for the offence was the victim’s refusal to admit the defendant’s companion into a night club.

Judgement
Hostility demonstrated

Ratio decidendi
It held there was a demonstration of racial hostility within the ambit of section 28(1)(a).

R v Rogers [2007]

Category
Racially aggravated assault

Story
A disabled man riding his mobility scooter along the pavement, shouting the words bloody foreigners at a group of Spanish women who were impeding his way. Consequently, he was charged with a racially aggravated offence of using abusive words to provoke violence under Crime and Disorder Act 1998 s.31.

Judgement
Guilty of racially aggravated offence

Ratio decidendi
The House held that the statute did not intend to limit the approach to defining the ‘racial group’, therefore, its proper interpretation included both race, ethnic and national origins and nationality.

R v Ireland [1998]

Category
Psychological harm

Story
The defendant made a series of silent telephone calls over three months to three different women. He was convicted under s.47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861. He appealed contending that silence cannot amount to an assault and that psychiatric injury is not bodily harm.

Judgement
Psychological harm (assault) convicted

Ratio decidendi
His conviction was upheld. Silence can amount to an assault and psychiatric injury, thus can amount to bodily harm.

R v Burstow [1998]

Category
Psychological harm

Story
The defendant and victim were engaged in a short romantic relationship, which the victim ended. Unhappy with this decision, the defendant proceeded to harass the victim over several months, making repeated phone calls, delivering hate mail, including scattered condoms in their garden, causing her to sustain psychiatric injury (severe depression).

Judgement
Psychiatric injury could amount to bodily harm.

Ratio decidendi
In this instance, to reflect the impact upon her the defendant was actually charged with a more serious offence of s.20 offences against the person act 1861.

There was thus no requirement that physical force is directly or indirectly applied.

R v Donovan [1934]

Category
Consent as defence

Story
The defendant argued that the victim agreed to meet him knowing about his sexual intentions, and she gave indications that she was consenting throughout. Hence, the defendant, in order to gratify a perverted sexual passion, decided to beat the victim with a cane. Eventually, this left seven or eight red marks on her body. The judge directed the jury that ‘consent or no consent’ was the issue. Therefore, the defendant was subsequently convicted of both indecent assault and common assault.

Judgement
Consent does not make an unlawful conduct lawful

Ratio decidendi
The courts held that, where a person acts with intention to inflict bodily harm, whether the victim consents or not. It does not make an unlawful conduct lawful. In addition, where there is a question as to whether the defendant intended to inflict such harm, the burden of negativing consent falls upon the prosecution.

AG's Reference (No.6 of 1980) [1981]

Category
Consent as defence

Story
Two youths aged 17 and 18 had an argument in a public street and they decided to settle their argument with a fist fight. They both consented to the fight. One sustained bruising to the face and a bleeding nose.

Judgement
Consent does not make an unlawful conduct lawful

Ratio decidendi
The only defences found to be available were those permitted by law, i.e. sport, medical procedure, self-defence or the prevention of a crime.

R v BM [2018]

Category
Consent as defence

Story
The defendant, a tattooist, carried out body modifications including the removal of a customer’s ear, the removal of a customer’s nipple and the division of a customer’s tongue to produce an effect similar to reptilian tongues. D was convicted with wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm contrary to s18 OAPA 1861.

Judgement
Consent does not work

Ratio decidendi
Consent offered no defence to s18 OAPA 1861.

R v Wilson [1996]

Category
Consent as defence
Recognized exception

Story
The defendant branded his initials on his wife’s buttocks with a hot knife. She had asked him to do so. Her skin became infected and she sought medical treatment from her doctor. The doctor reported the matter to the police and the husband was charged with ABH under s.47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861.

Judgement
Consent worked.

Ratio decidendi
The wife’s consent was valid. The branding was more akin to tattooing and cosmetic enhancement rather than infliction of pain for sexual gratification. The court further held that consensual activity between husband and wife in the privacy of the matrimonial home was not a matter for the courts.

R v Barnes [2004]

Category
Consent as defence
Recognized exception

Story
The appellant was an amateur footballer. He was playing a football match, went in for a tackle and seriously injured his opponent’s leg. He was charged with inflicting grievous bodily harm under section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.

Judgement
Consent worked.

Ratio decidendi
Participation in a sport such as football gives rise to implicit consent to a risk of injury and even grievous bodily harm. If an injury or act occurs that cannot reasonably be considered to be acceptable when playing sport, then there is no implicit consent and the conduct will not be covered by a defence.

In the present circumstances, the judge held that the actions of the appellant could not reasonably be considered to have gone beyond what is acceptable in sport and did not require criminal intervene.

R v Jones [1986]

Category
Consent as defence
Recognized exception

Story
The appellants were schoolboys. They were convicted of inflicting GBH on two fellow school mates having thrown them into the air with the intention of catching them. Unfortunately they had dropped them resulting in serious injury including a ruptured spleen. Evidence was produced that the boys had engaged in the activity before without injury and that it was taken by all as a joke with no intention to cause injury.

Judgement
Consent worked

Ratio decidendi
The convictions were quashed. Consent to rough and undisciplined horseplay is a defence and even if there was no actual consent, if the appellants had a genuine belief in consent they should be allowed the defence. There was no requirement that the belief be reasonably held, provided it was genuine.

R v Brown and others [1993]

Category
Consent as defence

Story
The 5 men were convicted on various counts of ABH and wounding under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The injuries were inflicted during consensual homosexual sadomasochist activities. The trial judge ruled that the consent of the victim conferred no defence and the appellants thus pleaded guilty and appealed. The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions.

Judgement
Consent does not work

Ratio decidendi
Held: 3:2 The defence of consent cannot be relied on in offences under s.47 and s.20 OAPA 1861 where the injuries resulted from sadomasochist activities.

R v Dica [2004]

Category
Consent as defence

Story
The defendant, Mohamed Dica was charged with inflicting two counts of grievous bodily harm under s 20 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. The defendant was charged on the basis that while knowing he was HIV positive, he had unprotected sexual intercourse with two women who were unaware of his infection. Both women were infected with HIV.

Judgement
Consent worked.

Ratio decidendi
The court held that there had been no intention to spread the infection, but by the complainants consenting to unprotected sexual intercourse, they are prepared, “knowingly, to run the risk – not the certainty – of infection,” as well as other inherent risks such as unintended pregnancy.

R v Emmett [1999]

Category
Consent as defence

Story
A man who asphyxiated (meaning suffocated) his fiancée on one occasion and poured lighter fuel onto her breasts on another occasion during consensual sexual activity.

Judgement
Consent does not work

Ratio decidendi
The issue of consent was immaterial where there was a realistic risk of harm beyond a merely transient or trivial injury. The degree of harm was such as to make it appropriate for the criminal law to interfere and accordingly the appeal was dismissed.

The real reason is from the public policy: what the defendant was consenting to, that activity that was actually being undertaken was not in the public interest.

DPP v Majewski [1977]

Category
Voluntary intoxication

Story
The defendant (Majewski) was convicted following a brawl in a pub in which he assaulted the landlord and customers and the police officers who arrested him. His defence was that he was under the influence of drink and drugs at the time so he contended that he could not be convicted when he lacked the mens rea of the offences due to his intoxicated state.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
The crime was one of basic intent and therefore his intoxication could not be relied on as a defence. The Lord Judge drew a distinction between offences of “basic intent” and “specific intent” and held that in cases of the former, voluntary intoxication cannot form the basis for a defence even if the intoxication produces a state of automatism.

R v Heard [2007]

Category
Voluntary intoxication
Basic intent

Story
The police had been called to the defendant’s house; he had been self-harming at the time, appearing depressive and emotional, as well as intoxicated. After requesting help from the police officers, they took him to hospital where he became disruptive and loud in the waiting room. They took him outside where he danced suggestively and took his penis out and rubbed it on one of the officer’s thigh. The defendant could not recall the incident.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and affirmed that sexual assault was a basic intent offence. It can only be committed by intention to touch and the trial judge was correct in his statement that voluntary intoxication is not an excuse or defence to sexual assault.

R v Lipman [1970]

Category
Voluntary intoxication
Basic intent

Story
The defendant had taken some LSD. He was hallucinating and believed he was being attacked by snakes and descending to the centre of the earth. Whilst in this state he killed a girl by cramming bed sheets into her mouth.

Judgement
Conviction of manslaughter upheld.

Ratio decidendi
His intoxication could be used to demonstrate that he lacked the mens rea for murder as murder is a crime of specific intent. His intoxication could not be a defence to manslaughter as it is a crime of basic intent.

R v Hardie [1985]

Category
Involuntary intoxication

Story
The defendant set light to a wardrobe after consuming some out of date valium tablets which had been prescribed to his partner. He took the valium tablets as he was feeling stressed as his partner had asked him to leave their home. He was charged with arson at his trial he stated that he remembered nothing of starting the fire due to his intoxicated state but accepted that he must have started the fire.

The trial judge held his intoxication could be no defence to the crime committed. The defendant appealed.

Issue
Whether the defence of involuntary intoxication was available to Hardie, and taken into account when considering Hardie’s state of mind in respect of all aspects of mens rea.

Judgement
Appeal allowed.

Ratio decidendi
Conviction quashed, because Valium was taken for the purpose of calming the nerves only, that it was old stock and that the Appellant was told it would do him no harm.

R v Allen [1988]

Category
Involuntary intoxication

Story
Mr Allen consumed homemade wine that unknowingly to him was much stronger than he initially thought. As such, it had a much stronger effect than he anticipated. He sexually assaulted a person while under the influence of alcohol. He relied on the defence of involuntary intoxication and pleaded that he could not be responsible for his actions.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi

R v Kingston [1994]

Category
Involuntary intoxication

Story
Barry Kingston was involuntarily drugged by a friend. While Kingston was intoxicated, his friend encouraged him to perform sexual acts on a 15 year old boy. The incident had been a set up by his friend. Kingston was convicted of indecent assault. Kingston’s defence was that if he had not been drugged, he would not have acted the way he did.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
The Court found that although the drugs had essentially done away with Kingston’s inhibitions, this did not negative the necessary mental element which was found to be present in Kingston’s conduct. Further, if an intention arose in circumstances for which Kingston had no blame, it is still an unlawful intent that does not warrant an acquittal.

House of Lords:
There is no principle of English law which allows a defence based on involuntary intoxication where the defendant is found to have the necessary mens rea for the crime. The prosecution had established the defendant had the necessary intent for the crime – a drunken intent is still an intent. (Actually the real reason is that the victim is a 15yo boy.)

A-G for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963]

Category
Dutch courage

Story
The Respondent was an aggressive psychopath and prone to violent outbursts. This was particularly so if he had taken alcohol. He was frequently violent towards his wife. He had spent some time in a mental hospital for which he blamed his wife. On his release he went out and brought a bottle of whiskey and a knife. He intended to use the knife to kill his wife and brought the whiskey as he knew that this would make him aggressive to the extent that he would be able to kill. He drank the whiskey and killed his wife with the knife and a hammer.

Judgement
Conviction of murder upheld.

Ratio decidendi
Where a person forms the intention to kill and drinks in order to give themselves Dutch courage, they can not then rely on their intoxication to demonstrate they did not have the necessary mens rea.

R v Williams (Gladstone) [1984]

Category
Defence
Mistake

Story
A police officer witnessed a youth rob a woman in the street. He caught the youth and held him down. The defendant saw the police officer arresting the youth and thought that he was assaulting him because the police officer failed to produce the warrant card. Seeking to defend the youth, the appellant then assaulted the police officer.

Judgement
Conviction quashed

Ratio decidendi
The Court held that the necessity element must be based on an honest belief, but there is no requirement of reasonable grounds. The appellant was to be judged according to his mistaken view that X was assaulting the youth. Lord Lane CJ:

The reasonableness or unreasonableness of the defendant’s belief is material to the question of whether the belief was held by the defendant at all.

R v O’Grady [1987]

Category
Defence
Intoxication
Mistake

Story
The defendant and his 2 friends drank substantial quantities of cider. They then fought and the defendant killed one of the friends. His defence was that he mistakenly thought his friend was attacking him. He appealed his conviction for manslaughter.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
It ruled that a drunken mistake can only be used to (partially) negate mens rea (and only for crimes of specific intent) and not to justify an unreasonable use of force in a plea of self-defence.

R v Graham [1982]

Category
Defence
Duress

Story
Paul Graham had been drinking and taking drugs when he and his homosexual partner Mr. King killed Graham’s wife. Graham claimed he was under duress as his co-defendant was a violent man. He was charged with first-degree murder. He appealed against the conviction on the basis that the trial judge applied a subjective test to the defence of duress.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
This authority defined test for duress:

1. Did the defendant reasonably believe (and have good cause to believe) that if he did not do the act he (or his family) would be killed or caused serious injury?

2. If so, have the Prosecution made the jury sure that a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing the characteristics of the defendant, would not have given in to the threats?

R v Hudson and Taylor [1971]

Category
Defence
Duress
Imminence of the threat

Story
Hudson and Taylor were 2 girls who were charged with perjury having given false evidence by failing to identify an individual in the courtroom, during the course of a trial. They had self-confessed that the evidence they had given was false and used the defence of duress on the basis that they had been frightened by threat of injury to them if they had identified the individual. They argued that they had seen an individual in the courtroom who was known for violent behaviour. The jury was directed that duress could not provide a defence in the circumstances and on this basis, they were convicted.

Judgement
Conviction quashed

Ratio decidendi
An essential part of the defence of duress was that the threat should be enough to neutralize the will of the accused at the time the crime was committed. On this basis, the jury should have been able to decide to what extent that the impact of the perceived threat had on the circumstances. It was held that just because the threats, in this case, could not be implemented at the relevant moment, it did not mean that the threat was any less ‘present’ to neutralize the girls’ will.

R v Sharp [1987]

Category
Defence
Duress
Voluntary association with criminals

Story
Mr. Sharp joined a gang who carried out armed robberies. On the court he claimed during the robbery to the post office he wished to leave but was threatened with a gun pointed at his head if he did so. He then had to continue the robbery in which the postmaster was killed. He was convicted of murder and his appeal was dismissed.

Judgement
Conviction of murder upheld

Ratio decidendi
Lord Lane CJ: “Where a person voluntarily and with knowledge of its nature joined a criminal organization which he knew might bring pressure on him to commit an offence, and was an active member when he was put under such pressure, he cannot avail himself of the defence of duress.”

R v Howe (and Bannister) [1987]

Category
Defence
Duress
Limits on the availability of the defence

Story
Howe aged 19 & Bailey aged 20, were acting under orders of Murray aged 35. The charges related to two murders and one conspiracy to murder. Howe and Bannister tortured and took part in the killing of 2 boy victims (aged 17 and 19). Howe claimed they were told they would succumb to similar treatment if they did not do as Murray ordered.

Judgement
Conviction of murder upheld

Ratio decidendi
Duress is not a defence to a charge of murder, whether the accused acted to protect his own life or the life of his family. Accordingly, the defence is not available to the person who killed the victim or those who participated in the murder as principals in the second degree.

R v Gotts [1992]

Category
Defence
Duress
Limits on the availability of the defence

Story
Gotts, a 16yo boy, tried to kill his mother as he claimed that his father had threatened to shoot him unless he did so. Gotts stabbed his mother and caused serious injuries from which she survived. Gotts was charged with attempted murder.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
The trial judge ruled that the defence of duress was not available to him on a charge of attempted murder and instructed the jury to not consider this matter.

Beckford v R [1988]

Category
Defence
Self-defence in common law

Story
This happened in Jamaica. A policeman, during an operation, shot an unarmed man in the honest belief that the man had a gun was going to shoot him.

The jury convicted him of murder (which carries the death penalty in Jamaica). He appealed contending the judge was wrong to direct that the mistake needed to be reasonably held.

Judgement
Conviction quashed

Ratio decidendi
The test to be applied for self-defence is that a person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances as he honestly believes them to be in the defence of himself or another.

R v Chan-Fook [1994]

Category
Defence
Psychiatric injury

Story
Mr Chan-Fook and Mrs. Fox were engaged. A French student was Mrs Fox’s tenant. Mrs. Fox’ engagement ring was missing and Mr Chan-Fook accused the tenant student of stealing it. He interrogated the student and locked him in an upstairs room and threatened him with further violence.

The student tried to escape but hurt himself with fractures.

The prosecution did not frame the case in relation to the physical injuries but went into the mental state of the victim and the fear and panic he suffered. No medical evidence was produced to support a finding of psychiatric injury.

Judgement
Conviction quashed

Ratio decidendi
To amount to actual bodily harm, the injury need not be permanent but should not be so trivial as to be wholly insignificant. Feelings of fear and panic are emotions rather than an injury and without medical evidence to support recognized psychiatric condition a conviction for ABH could not stand.

6 – Sexual Offences

R v Kirk and Kirk [2008]

Category
Rape
Consent

Story
A 14yo girl has been abused by her aunt’s husband P. Kirk and his brother T. Kirk. She ran away from home and lived on the street. One day she was cold and hungry so she went to a coffee shop where T. Kirk was working. T. Kirk gave her £3.45 to have sex with her. She agreed and got the £3.45.

Judgement
Kirk brothers imprisoned

Ratio decidendi
The judge, in summing up told the jury that they must draw a distinction between ‘willing submission’ and real consent. P and T were imprisoned for 11 and 7 years respectively.

R v Bree [2007]

Category
Rape
Consent

Story
The defendant, Mr Bree (B), visited his brother at University and went for an evening party that included the complainant (C). Both were drunk. They returned to B’s brother’s home. Whilst C’s memory from this point is poor, she recalls vomiting and having B and his brother help wash the vomit from her hair. Her next memory is of her and B having sexual intercourse. C contended that, although she had not specifically said ‘no’ to intercourse, she had not consented. B contended that he had reasonably believed she was consenting as she had undressed herself, appeared willing and been conscious throughout the event.

Judgement
Not convicted to rape

Ratio decidendi
Under s74 Sexual Offences Act 2003, if the victim was intoxicated to the extent that she was unable to engage in sexual intercourse, she has not consented.

But the victim can be intoxicated and still retain the ability to consent.

Consent may evaporate even before the victim becomes conscious Whether that there was consent is fact-specific and depended on the actual state of mind of the individuals involved.

It is unrealistic to devise a ‘grid system’ where consent is dependent on the level of alcohol consumption.

R v H [2005]

Category
Touching

Story
The appellant approached the victim with a sexual proposition. The victim walked away but the appellant approached her again, and shouted “do you fancy a shag” while grabbing her pocket and attempting to pull her towards him, however, the victim managed to escape. Consequently, the appellant was charged with Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.3.

Issue
Did touching the victim’s clothes constitute touching within the meaning of s.79(8) of the Act?

Judgement
Sexual assault convicted

Ratio decidendi
Touching can be sexual. The Court found that touching the victim’s clothing can amount to touching required for sexual assault. The touching, however, is not automatically sexual by nature. It is up to the jury to determine whether the touching is of sexual nature and whether the purpose of touching is sexual too.

R v Wright [2007]

Category
Rape
Voluntary intoxication

Story
The complainant was unconscious as a result of voluntary alcohol intoxication immediately prior to sexual intercourse, although the defence disputed this.

Ratio decidendi
A judge’s directions on the issue of consent in the context of an alleged rape where the victim had been voluntarily intoxicated had been adequate and additional directions would only have served to confuse the jury further. The issue in the case came down to which individual had been telling the truth.

Kaitamaki v R [1985]

Category
xxx

Story
The defendant initiated sex with the complainant. When sex began, either the woman consented or the defendant believed that she consented. However, during sex he realized that she was not consenting or was no longer consenting, but did not stop.

The defendant was charged with rape. The trial judge directed the jury that if the defendant failed to stop when he realised she was not consenting, his actions became rape even if the woman initially consented.

Issue
Can consent to a sex act be withdrawn after the act has begun?

Judgement
Rape convicted

Ratio decidendi
Sexual intercourse is a continuing act which only ends with withdrawal. If the complainant stops consenting during the act, and the man realized this, that was rape. The judge had therefore correctly directed the jury.

7 – Theft & Rubbery

DPP v Gomez [1993]

Category
Appropriation

Story
Gomez, the defendant, is an assistant manager of a shop. He received two stolen cheques as payment for goods and persuaded his manager to accept by lying. Gomez was charged with theft but argued that as the transfer of goods was consented to by the manager and there was no appropriation.

Judgement
Appropriation exists. Theft convicted.

Ratio decidendi
The Court held that there could be an “appropriation” even where the owner (i.e. the shop manager) consented. This case therefore introduces a subjective basis for appropriation and the manifest criminality required by an adverse assumption of rights is not required for a “dishonest appropriation.”

R v Hinks [2000]

Category
Appropriation

Story
Karen Hinks befriended with John Dolphin who was naive and of limited intelligence. Hinks influenced the man to withdraw £60,000 from his bank account and to deposit into her account as gifts. When she was convicted theft she contended on the ground that the £60,000 given were gifts which were valid in civil law.

Judgement
Appropriation exists. Theft convicted.

Ratio decidendi
An appropriation exists even where the victim consents to the appropriation and civil unlawfulness is not a constituent of the offence of theft.

Oxford v Moss [1979]

Category
Property
Intangible property

Story
A student copied an examination paper and returned it, and then was convicted of theft.

Judgement
No theft convicted

Ratio decidendi
Conviction for theft was quashed as confidential information cannot be stolen. In s4(1) of the 1968 Act, “intangible property” did not include confidential information.

R v Turner (No 2) [1971]

Category
Belonging to another

Story
The defendant took his car to a garage for repairs, after the repair was done he took the car without paying for the repairs.

Judgement
Theft convicted

Ratio decidendi
The Court held that property belonged to a person if at the time of the appropriation that person was in fact in possession or control of it. The words “possession or control” was defined in section 5(1) of the 1968 Act.

Edwards v Ddin [1976]

Category
Belonging to another

Story
After a defendant filled his car with petrol and then whilst washing his hands, formed the intention not to pay for the petrol and left the station without having paid.

Judgement
The defendant could not be convicted of theft under s.1(1), but convicted under s.3(2)

Ratio decidendi
He could not be convicted of theft under s1(1) Theft Act 1968 because by the time he had formed the requisite mens rea for the commission of the offence, that is, dishonestly intending to permanently deny ownership of the petrol, the property in the petrol had already been transferred to him (not belonging to another).

R v Wain [1995]

Category
Belonging to another

Story
The defendant, by organizing events, raised money for a company which distributed money among charities. He paid what he had raised into a special bank account and thereafter, with the consent of the company, into his own bank account. He then dishonestly dissipated the credit in his account.

Judgement
Theft convicted

Ratio decidendi
The Court of Appeal held that he thereby appropriated property belonging to another because the jury were entitled to find that he was a trustee of the money collected and had therefore received it subject to an obligation to retain its proceeds (the successive bank accounts) and deal with them in a particular way (to hand them over to the company).

R v Hall [1973]

Category
Belong to another
Deal with money in a particular way

Story
A travel agent received money from clients for deposits for their holidays. He paid these monies into the general current account for the business. The business collapsed before he paid the money to book the holidays and the clients lost their deposit.

Judgement
Conviction of theft quashed.

Ratio decidendi
Because although he had breached his contractual obligations to his clients and could be sued in respect of this breach, there had been no agreement that he should to deal with the money in a particular way under s.5(3) Theft Act 1968.

Ricketts v Basildon Magistrates' Court [2010]

Category
Belonging to another

Story
The appellant took 6 bags of used clothes near the back door of the British Heart Foundation (BHF), donated by some people. He intended to sell the items but got arrested and charged with theft. He brought an application for judicial review to quash their decision contending the items had been abandoned and therefore did not belong to anyone.

Judgement
Theft convicted

Ratio decidendi
The donor intended the items to be a gift to the BHF, they had attempted delivery of the gift, and the gift would be complete once BHF took possession of the items. The items still belonged to the donor until BHF took possession.

Williams v Phillips [1957]

Category
Belonging to another

Story & Judgement
A householder put trash out to be collected by the council authority workers. When the refuse workers decided to help themselves to that property, the court held that for as long as the refuse had not been collected by the local authority, it could be deemed as the householder’s property. Such a householder can reasonably sue for theft.

R v Ghosh [1982]

Category
Dishonesty

Story
The appellant was a surgeon who claimed money in respect of operations which was actually done by other doctors. He argued his actions were not dishonest as the same sums were legitimately due to him for consultancy fees.

Ratio decidendi
Ghosh test for dishonesty:

In determining whether the prosecution has proved that the defendant was acting dishonestly, a jury must first of all decide whether according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people what was done was dishonest.

Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd [2017]

Category
Dishonesty

Story
The claimant was a professional gambler who used a technique called ‘edge-sorting’ to enhance his odds of winning the defendant’s casino. He sought to claim winnings of £7.7 Million which the defendant casino refused to pay. The defendant accused the claimant of cheating (breached the contract between the parties).

Judgement
Dishonesty established.

Ratio decidendi
The claimant had cheated and therefore was in a repudiatory breach of contract. His winnings were not recoverable.

R v Marshall [1998]

Category
Dishonesty

Story
The appellants obtained part-used London Underground tickets and Travelcards from the underground users and resold them to other passengers. Consequently, they were convicted of theft to which they pleaded guilty. However, they appealed to their conviction arguing that Theft Act 1968 s.6(1) did nt apply because they never had the intention to permanently deprive the London Underground of its tickets. By selling the tickets to other passengers the tickets eventually return to the London Underground’s possession.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
The Court held that the appellants showed the required intention to treat the tickets as their own, when they started reselling them and disregarded the London Underground’s rights. Further, since the appellants had already pleaded to acting dishonestly, their convictions were safe.

R v Lloyd [1985]

Category
Intention to permanently deprive

Story
Defendant worked at cinema as chief projectionist, he took out movie tapes for hours at a time to other two defendants to be copied and sold. Defendant was convicted of theft under s1(1)

Judgement
Theft conviction quashed

Ratio decidendi
It was held that there was no “intention to permanently deprive”. Borrowing can amount to the intention to permanently deprive only if the intention was to return it in a changed state where it had lost its goodness, virtue or practical value. In this case, there was no such loss as films can still be screened.

Chan Man-Sin v AG for Hong Kong [1988]

Category
Intention to permanently deprive

Story
The defendant, a company accountant, drew a forged cheque on the company’s account knowing that the company would not be permanently deprived of their money because the bank would have a legal obligation to reimburse them. Hence the defendant argued that he lacked any intention to permanently deprive.

Judgement
Theft convicted

Ratio decidendi
The defendant had wrongly assumed the company’s rights over their bank credit and overdraft facility. This amounted to dishonest appropriation of property with intent to permanently deprive. It did not matter that the companies had the right to have their accounts restored by the bank

R v Robinson [1977]

Category
Robbery

Story
The defendant was owed £7 by a woman. He went to ask her for it and a fight developed between the defendant and the woman’s husband. During the fight a £5 note dropped out of the husband’s pocket. The defendant picked it up and kept it. He was convicted of robbery and appealed.

Judgement
Conviction quashed

Ratio decidendi
There was no theft under s.2(1)(a) since the defendant had an honest belief that he was entitled to the money.

R v Dawson and James [1977]

Category
Robbery

Story
One defendant nudged (body pushed) the victim who lost his balance enabling the second defendant to steal his wallet. The two defendants were convicted of robbery and appealed against their convictions on the basis that the nudging or pushing of the victim did not amount to the use of force on another person and, therefore, was insufficient to amount to the actus reus for robbery.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
The word force is to be given its ordinary meaning and requires no direction to the jury. The jury were entitled to find that force had been used.

R v Clouden [1987]

Category
Robbery

Story
The defendant approached the victim from behind whilst she was carrying a shopping basket in her left hand. He wrenched the basket down from her grasp and ran off with it (he didn’t touch her). The defendant was convicted of robbery under section 8(1) Theft Act 1968 and appealed against his conviction claiming the wrenching of the basket did not constitute the use of force on any person

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
There is no distinction to be found between the use of force on a person and the use of force to property which causes force to the person.

R v Hale [1979]

Category
Robbery

Story
Two defendants entered the victim’s house and stole her jewellery box from her bedroom. After having taken the box they tied her up. They were convicted of robbery and appealed against their convictions on the basis that the offence of theft was complete when they took possession of the jewellery box and they, therefore, did not use force immediately before or at the time of stealing.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
The whole course of conduct is considered as stealing, and appropriation does not immediately finish when the defendant’s conduct meets the minimum essential requirements for appropriation. The theft should be viewed in its entirety which comes to an end when the jury decides it does.

R v Feely [1973]

Category
Dishonesty

Story
The appellant was the manager in a betting shop. He borrowed £30 from the till and maintained that he intended to replace it within a few days. The trial judge held that his actions were clearly dishonest and his intention to replace the money was irrelevant.

Judgement
Conviction quashed

Ratio decidendi
The trial judge should have put the issue of dishonesty to the jury.

Sinclair v Neighbour [1966]

Category
Dishonesty

Story
This is actually an employment case.

An employee left a notice to his employer indicating an intention to return it, he took his employer’s money for a purpose of which he knew the employer would disapprove.

Judgement
The court held:

1. No dishonesty was involved.

2. But the conduct was sufficiently reprehensible to warrant summary dismissal (he was fired).

R v Rostron & Another [2003]

Category
Belonging to another

Story
The appellant was convicted of theft of the golf balls from the lake that belonged to the golf club. He contended that the balls were there for several years and were practically abandoned by the owners. Therefore, taking the balls did not amount to theft.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
The Court found that although abandoned the golf club was still the owner of the balls and that they were in full control of their property. Therefore, by going on the club’s property and removing the balls from there, the defendant committed theft. The direction to the jury was correct, the prosecution had to show that the defendant knew that he was not allowed to go to the club’s property and take the balls. Once he did that, he proved dishonesty.

8 – Drug Offences

R v Lambert [2001]

Category
Possession

Story
The case involves a man convicted of possession of a controlled drug, cocaine, with intent to supply, contrary to section 5 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, sentenced to 7 years imprisonment. The appellant argued on the basis of section 28 (3) (b) (i) of the Act that he had no knowledge or reason to belief that he was in possession of a controlled drug.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
Lord hope confirmed that possession involved both physical and mental elements. It is necessary to satisfied the following elements:

1. Actus rea: a person must have custody or control of the drug.

2. Mens rea: that they know that they are in possession of something.

R v Maginnis [1987]

Category
Supply of drugs

Story
The defendant was charged with possession of a controlled drug with intent to supply it to another under s.5(3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. A package containing £500 worth of cannabis was found in his car. The defendant stated the cannabis belonged to a friend who was picking it up later. The trial judge ruled that his action in handing the drugs back to the friend was an action of supply.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
Lord Keith explained that the word ‘supply’ connotes more than a mere transfer of physical control to another and contains the concept of enabling the recipient to apply the thing handed over for a purpose for which he desires.

R v Tao [1977]

Category
Occupier

Story
Tao was an undergraduate student at Cambridge who had occupied a room in a college hostel. He appealed a conviction for being an occupier of premises used for the smoking of cannabis.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
The court held that the term occupier was not limited to tenants or those who had a legal estate in the property, in this case Tao was actually a student who had a study bedroom in the college so he was then held to be an occupier as he had sufficient control of the premises.

R v Denslow [1998]

Category
Occupier

Judgement
The court held that the term occupier was not limited to tenants or those who had a legal estate in the property, in this case Tao was actually a student who had a study bedroom in the college so he was then held to be an occupier as he had sufficient control of the premises.

R v Showers [1995]

Category
Offering

Judgement
The offer may be by words or conduct.

Ratio decidendi
An offence of offering to supply can be prosecuted simply by proving the existence of an offer. The prosecution does not have to prove either that the defendant intended to produce the drugs or that the drugs were in his possession.

R v Dhillon [2000]

Category
Offering
Supply

Story
Karamjit Singh Dhillon and his brother Jasbir Singh Dhillon, offered to supply heroin to “Shaz” who was an undercover officer who gave evidence at the appellant’s trial.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
It was quite wrong to introduce the principles of the law of contract into the trial of a person charged with a supply of drugs.

R v Farr [1982]

Category
Production

Judgement
The Court of Appeal held that there must be established some identifiable participation in the process of producing a controlled drug before a person can be convicted under section 4. What that decision does not make clear (as reported) is whether section 4(1) and (2) excludes the ordinary rules in respect of participation by secondary parties and thus restricts liability under section 4(2).

9 – Attempts & Accomplice Liability

R v Gullefer [1987]

Category
Attempts
Actus reus

Story
The defendant, Mr Gullefer, had placed an £18 bet on a dog at a greyhound racing track. It became clear to Mr Gullefer during the race that his dog was not going to win. The defendant jumped onto the track hoping that the stewards would declare the race to be a ‘no race’, with the consequence that he would be entitled to a refund of his £18 stake.

The defendant was prosecuted for attempted theft of the £18.

Judgement
Conviction quashed (appeal allowed)

Ratio decidendi
He had not gone beyond mere preparation. The court held that, in jumping onto the track D was doing an act “merely preparatory” to theft of the stake he would have lost and D had not moved into the process of actually committing the theft (going to the bookies and asking for his money back).

R v Jones [1990]

Category
Attempts
Actus reus

Story
Defendant prepared to murder the victim, he bought a shotgun and shortened the barrel. He climbed into back of victim’s car but could not fire as safety was not released, victim grabbed the shotgun and threw it out of window. The defendant was charged with attempted murder but defendant’s lawyer argued that the “last act” test from R v Eagleton (1854) should apply.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
Gullefer was followed – had Parliament intended that the ‘last act’ test be applied to s1(1), a very different forms of words would have been used. Thus, the “last act” test should not be applied.

R v Campbell [1991]

Category
Attempts
Actus reus

Story
Tony Campbell (defendant) arrested after loitering outside a post office, wearing sunglasses and carrying something heavy, after police had been informed that a robbery was going to take place. The defendant had been waiting outside the post office, left, and then returned 30 minutes later, at which point he was arrested and discovered to have in his possession a gun and a demand note. The defendant was convicted of attempted robbery and appealed.

Judgement
Conviction quashed (appeal allowed)

Ratio decidendi
He had not gone beyond mere preparation. The acts completed were still only preparatory to the offence.

R v Whybrow [1951]

Category
Attempts
Mens rea

Story
The defendant wired up a soap dish in his bathroom and gave his wife an electric shock. Consequently, he was charged with an attempted murder. The Crown Court found the defendant guilty. At trial, the judge directed the jury that the mens rea for attempted murder was the same as for murder- intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
The Court found that the judge misdirected the jury, however, that did not render their verdict unsafe. The justices held that there was a distinction between the mens rea for murder and attempted murder. Where the defendant is charged with an attempted murder, the intent to kill is the key ingredient of the crime.

R v Pearman [1984]

Category
Attempts
Mens rea

Story
During a traffic stop, the defendant drunkenly swerved his car towards police officers. This knocked one officer into his police car. Another police officer avoided a collision by jumping behind the police car.

The defendant was charged with (among other offences) attempting to cause grievous bodily harm with intent to cause GBH, contrary to s.18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.

Judgement
No specific mens rea of intended to cause GBH found.

Ratio decidendi
For an attempt, the prosecution must prove that the defendant intended (either in the purposive or oblique sense) to commit the primary offence. Recklessness is insufficient. This is true regardless of the mens rea for the primary offence.

AG’s Reference No. 3 of 1992 [1994]

Category
Attempts
Mens rea

Story
Four men (the defendants) threw a petrol bomb from a moving car, which hit a wall nearby four men in a parked car and two standing men.

The defendants were charged with attempted aggravated arson with recklessness as to whether lives are endangered. The trial judge acquitted defendants, finding that recklessness as to whether life would be endangered as a result of the intended damage was insufficient to convict defendants of attempt. The judge ruled that D must have intended to not only damage property but also to endanger life to be convicted of attempted aggravated arson, as an attempted crime could not be committed without intent.

The Attorney General referred the case to the Court of Appeal.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
It was sufficient to prove the defendants intended to damage property, and was reckless as to whether life would be endangered.

Anderton v Ryan [1985]

Category
Impossibility

Story
A woman report a burglary in her house to the police, while they were investigating, she confessed to having purchased a VCR that she believed to be stolen.

No evidence was found to confirm that the VCR was indeed stolen. The woman was charged with attempted handling of stolen goods contrary to s1(1) Criminal Attempts Act 1981.

Judgement
Appeal allowed. Defendant was acquitted.

Ratio decidendi
The majority held that defendant could not be convicted because defendant’s act was ‘objectively innocent’ meaning that if completed, it could never have constituted the substantive offence of handling.

The decision was reversed by R v Shivpuri.

R v Shivpuri [1987]

Category
Impossibility

Story
Defendant was persuaded to act as a drugs courier. He collected a suitcase which contained several packages of white powder which he admitted in police interview that he believed to be heroin but was in fact legal snuff. D was charged with attempting to be knowingly concerned in dealing with and harbouring the controlled drug.

Judgement
Conviction upheld (appeal dismissed)

Ratio decidendi
Their Lordships overruled Anderton v Ryan.

The House held that firstly, in order to be found guilty of the above mention offence, it was sufficient to show that the person knew he was dealing with a type of substance that constituted a controlled drug. Therefore, the defendant was rightly convicted of Criminal Attempts Act 1981 s.1(1) and the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 s.170(1)(b).

AG’s Reference No.1 of 1975 [1975]

Category
Accomplice
Actus reus

Story
The defendant added alcohol to a motorist’s soft drink without the motorist’s knowledge or consent, despite knowing that the motorist would be driving home soon afterwards. The motorist was stopped by the police on the way home; his blood alcohol concentration was above the prescribed limit so he’s convicted drunk and drive.

The defendant was charged with aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of the motorist’s offence under s.8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 but was later acquitted due to no case to answer. AG appealed.

Judgement
“No case to answer” was wrong.

Ratio decidendi
There is a requirement for a causal link between what the procure adores, and the commission of the offence by the principle. So there will usually also be a mental link there, but case law has confirmed that this is not essential.

R v Allan [1965]

Category
Accomplice
Actus reus

Story
Mr. Allan was convicted of second degree to an affray as he expressed his intention to join in and help their allies if necessary.

Judgement
Conviction quashed (appeal allowed)

Ratio decidendi
The Court found that there has to be at least some form of encouragement by the accused in order to find them guilty of second degree to any crime.

National Coal Board v Gamble [1959]

Category
Accomplice
Mens rea

Story
A truck driver was allowed to carry an excess load of coal by an employee of the National Coal Board (NCB). Later he was caught by the police and convicted.

Then NCB was tried as an accessory to the offence and convicted.

NCB appealed on the basis that it had no motive to encourage the commission of the principal offence.

Judgement
Conviction upheld (appeal dismissed)

Ratio decidendi
The accomplice:

1. must intend to assist or encourage the commission of the principal offence; AND

2. have knowledge of the circumstances which constitute this offence.

R v Bainbridge [1960]

Category
Accomplice
Mens rea

Story
The defendant purchased oxygen-cutting equipment. Weeks later, the equipment was used in a bank break-in and was left behind by the thieves. The defendant was convicted as an accessory before the fact. The conviction was founded upon the argument that the defendant purchased the equipment on behalf of the thieves and knew that it was to be used for breaking in to premises. The defendant appealed.

Judgement
Conviction upheld (appeal dismissed)

Ratio decidendi
Court of Appeal held that all the prosecution has to establish was that Bainbridge knew that the equipment was going to be used to commit a burglary. And he did not need to know the exact precise details there.

Maxwell v DPP for Northern Ireland [1978]

Category
Accomplice
Mens rea

Story
Mr. Maxwell, the accomplice defendant, was a member of a terrorist organization (UVF) that attacked Catholics in UK.

Maxwell was instructed to lead a group of men to an inn, who placed a bomb in the inn without letting Maxwell know the details.

Maxwell was charged with aiding and abetting and he appealed based on the ground he had no knowledge of the bomb planting.

Judgement
Conviction upheld (appeal dismissed)

Ratio decidendi
The House held that although the defendant was not aware that the group sought to bomb the inn, as the member of the UVF he did know that there was a risk of such an attack to occur. Since the defendant was aware of the essential matters that amounted to the offence, the House upheld his conviction for aiding and abetting.

R v Howe [1987]

Category
Accomplice
Mens rea

Story
In this case there are D1 and D2.

D2 went to D1, gave D1 a gun and told him it is loaded with blank ammunition. D2 then told D1 to go and scare the victim by firing the gun at him. And in fact, the gun is loaded with live ammunition and D2 knew this.

D1 fired the gun and killed the victim.

Judgement
Accomplice has a higher mens rea than the principal

Ratio decidendi
It’s clear here D1 is the principal offender because he is the person who actually killed the victim. But he had no idea that the court actually contained real ammunition. So he will only be guilty of constructive manslaughter. The reason is that he committed an unlawful and dangerous act, in this case, an assault as he intended to scare the victim, which then caused the victim’s death.

Now, in contrast to that the second defendant is going to be guilty as an accomplice to murder. And that’s because he knew that the gun was loaded with real ammunition, and he actually intended to kill the victim. Now, in that example, that we’ve just considered, the accomplice has a higher mens rea than the principal.

R v Gilmour [2000]

Category
Accomplice
Mens rea

Story
Gilmour drove the two principals to a house where they threw a petrol bomb resulting in the deaths of three children from the resulting house fire. Gilmour remained in the car throughout.

Judgement
Accomplice has a less mens rea than the principal

Ratio decidendi
The court held that the accomplice Gilmore only believed that they were going to cause damage and Gilmore’s liability should be based on the degree of intent with which he had acted to hear knowledge that an unlawful and dangerous act was to take place, and therefore he was guilty of constructive manslaughter.

R v Jogee [2016]

Category
Accomplice
Mens rea

Story
Jogee and his co-defendant, Hirsi, spent the evening taking drugs and drinking alcohol causing their behaviour to become increasingly aggressive. During the night they visited a house and an angry exchange ensued between a man from the house (victim) and the 2 defendants. Jogee was outside shouting encouragement to Hirsi who stabbed and killed the victim.

Judgement
Conviction quashed (appeal allowed)

Ratio decidendi
The Supreme Court reversed previous case law (Chan Wing-Siu 1985) on joint enterprise: “the law on accomplice liability had actually gone astray”.

The court held that in order to prove accessorial liability, it was not sufficient to only prove the necessary mental element, but also the element of conduct. This could be discharged by proving that the accessory either assisted or at least encouraged the principal in committing the offence. The mental element is discharged by proving that the accessory intended to so assist or encourage the principal. The mental element however is not discharged by mere foresight that the principal might commit an offence. Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] 1 AC 168 was incorrectly decided in the part of equating foresight with intent. The convictions were therefore quashed

R v Grundy [1977]

Category
Accomplice
Mens rea

Story
The defendant supplied a burglar with information about a building, including the owner’s routine. Afterwards, however, he then tried to persuade and prevent the burglar from going through with the burglary. He was unsuccessful.

At trial, the defendant argued that he was not guilty of aiding and abetting the burglary, as he had withdrawn from the offence prior to its completion.

Judgement
Conviction quashed (appeal allowed)

Ratio decidendi
If the offence has yet to be committed, the defendant can withdraw their participation merely by telling the others involved that he does not intend to participate.

(The decision was quite criticized by some academics that the defendant has not done enough, i.e. he should have informed the police and/or the property owner)

R v Becerra [1975]

Category
Accomplice
Mens rea

Story
In this case there are D1 and D2.

D1 provided D2 with a knife prior to a burglary in a house.

D1 departed from scene when he saw a man coming and shouted ‘come on, let’s go’ to D2

D2 did’n’t leave, but killed the victim with the knife.

D1 was convicted as accessory to the murder.

Judgement
Conviction upheld (appeal dismissed)

Ratio decidendi
The words ‘come on, let’s go’ was insufficient as communication of withdrawal (he didn’t take the knife back).

“Something more than a change of intention and physical change of place is needed to withdraw from a common enterprise. What is required depends on the facts of each case, but there is one essential element: where practical and reasonable, ‘timely communication’ of the intention to abandon the common purpose to those who wish to continue.”

R v Cogan and Leak [1976]

Category
Accomplice
Mens rea

Story
D1 and the victim are husband and wife. D1 and D2 are friends.

D1 told his wife that he was interested in watching her having sex with D2. D2 had sex with the wife without her consent.

Consequently, D1 was convicted of aiding and abetting.

D2 was charged with rape. D2 appealed to his conviction on the grounds that he honestly believed that he had the wife’s consent. The court allowed the appeal and quashed D2’s conviction.

Judgement
Conviction to D1 upheld

Ratio decidendi
D1 was still liable for aiding and abetting rape because Leak’s wife was raped due to Leak’s desire to have his wife raped.

R v Gnango [2011] UKSC 5

Category
Accomplice
Mens rea

Story
The defendant was a London teenager engaged in gang warfare. One when when he was having gunfight with “someone“, the victim was walking through and was tragically killed by “someone”s” shot. This someone as charged with murder but he was never caught.

At trial, judge directed the jury that they could find the defendant as part of joint enterprise along with “someone”. So provided that the jury found that the defendant could forsee the result, the defendant could also be convicted of murder.

Judgement
Conviction upheld

Ratio decidendi
The defendant was guilty of murder as an accessory and based on the transferred malice although the principal cannot be identified or found.